

*President Clinton*

# China and the National Interest

October 24, 1997

*Remarks at the Voice of America, Washington, DC.*

Thank you very much, Ambassador Platt. I thank the Asia Society and the U.S.-China Education Foundation for bringing us together today. I thank Senator Baucus and Congressmen Dreier, Matsui, and Roemer for being here; Secretary Albright, Ambassador Barshefsky, National Security Adviser Berger, the other distinguished officials from the State Department; and I thank especially the members of the diplomatic corps who are here, and the students. And, especially, let me thank two of my favorite people—Joe Duffy and Evelyn Lieberman—for the work of the Voice of America and the USIA—all that they do to promote the free flow of ideas around the world.

Next week, when President Jiang Zemin comes to Washington, it will be the first state visit by a Chinese leader to the United States for more than a decade. The visit gives us the opportunity and the responsibility to chart a course for the future that is more positive and more stable and, hopefully, more productive than our relations have been for the last few years.

China is a great country with a rich and proud history and a strong future. It will, for good or ill, play a very large role in shaping the 21st century in which the children in this audience today—children all across our country, all across China, and, indeed, all across the world—will live.

At the dawn of the new century, China stands at a crossroads. The direction China takes toward cooperation or conflict will profoundly affect Asia, America, and the world for decades. The emergence of a China as a power that is stable, open, and nonaggressive; that embraces free markets, political pluralism, and the rule of law; that works with us to build a secure international order—that kind of China, rather than a China turned inward and confrontational, is deeply in the interests of the American people.

Of course, China will choose its own destiny. Yet by working with China and expanding areas of cooperation, dealing

forthrightly with our differences, we can advance fundamental American interests and values.

**First**, the United States has a profound interest in promoting a peaceful, prosperous, and stable world. Our task will be much easier if China is a part of that process—not only playing by the rules of international behavior, but helping to write and enforce them.

China is a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council. Its support was crucial for peacekeeping efforts in Cambodia and building international mandates to reverse Iraq's aggression against Kuwait and restore democracy to Haiti. As a neighbor of India and Pakistan, China will influence whether these great democracies move toward responsible cooperation both with each other and with China.

From the Persian Gulf to the Caspian Sea, China's need for a reliable and efficient supply of energy to fuel its growth can make it a force for stability in these strategically critical regions. Next week, President Jiang and I will discuss our visions of the future and the kind of strategic relationship we must have to promote cooperation, not conflict.

**Second**, the United States has a profound interest in peace and stability in Asia. Three times this century, Americans have fought and died in Asian wars—37,000 Americans still patrol the Cold War's last frontier, on the Korean DMZ. Territorial disputes that could flair in the crises affecting America require us to maintain a strong American security presence in Asia. We want China to be a powerful force for security and cooperation there.

China has helped us convince North Korea to freeze and ultimately end its dangerous nuclear program. Just imagine how much more dangerous that volatile peninsula would be today if North Korea, reeling from food shortages, with a million soldiers encamped 27 miles from Seoul, had continued this nuclear program.

China also agreed to take part in the four-party peace talks that President Kim and I proposed with North Korea, the only realistic

avenue to a lasting peace. And China is playing an increasingly constructive role in Southeast Asia by working with us and the members of ASEAN to advance our shared interests in economic and political security.

Next week I'll discuss with President Jiang the steps we can take together to advance the peace process in Korea. We'll look at ways to strengthen our military to military contacts, decreasing the chances of miscalculation, and broadening America's contacts with the next generation of China's military leaders. And I will reiterate to President Jiang America's continuing support for our one-China policy, which has allowed democracy to flourish in Taiwan, and Taiwan's relationship with the PRC to grow more stable and to prosper. The Taiwan question can only be settled by the Chinese themselves, peacefully.

**Third**, the United States has a profound interest in keeping weapons of mass destruction and other sophisticated weapons out of unstable regions and away from rogue states and terrorists. In the 21st century, many of the threats to our security will come not from great power conflict, but from states that defy the international community and violent groups seeking to undermine peace, stability, and democracy. China is already a nuclear power with increasingly sophisticated industrial and technological capabilities. We need its help to prevent dangerous weapons from falling into the wrong hands.

For years, China stood outside the major international arms control regimes. Over the past decade, it has made important and welcome decisions to join the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, the Chemical Weapons Convention, the Biological Weapons Convention, and to respect key provisions of the Missile Technology Control Regime. Last year at the United Nations, I was proud to be the first world leader to sign the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. China's Foreign Minister was the second leader to do so.

China has lived up to its pledge not to assist unsafeguarded nuclear facilities in third countries, and it is developing a system of export controls to prevent the transfer or sale of technology for weapons of mass destruction.

But China still maintains some troubling weapons supply relationships. At the summit, I will discuss with President Jiang further steps we hope China will take to end or limit some of these supply relationships and to strengthen and broaden its export control system. And I will make the case to him that these steps are—first and foremost—in China's interest, because the spread of dangerous weapons and technology would increase instability near China's own borders.

**Fourth**, the United States has a profound interest in fighting drug-trafficking and international organized crime. Increasingly, smugglers and criminals are taking advantage of China's vast territory and its borders with 15 nations to move drugs and weapons, aliens, and the proceeds of illegal activities from one point in Asia to another, or from Asia to Europe.

China and the United States already are cooperating closely on alien smuggling, and China has taken a tough line against narco-trafficking—a threat to its children as well as our own. Next week, I will propose to President Jiang that our law enforcement communities intensify their efforts together.

**Fifth**, the United States has a profound interest in making global trade and investment as free, fair, and open as possible. Over the past five years, trade has produced more than one-third of America's economic growth. If we are to continue generating good jobs and higher incomes in our country, when we are just 4% of the world's population, we must continue to sell more to the other 96%. One of the best ways to do that is to bring China more fully into the world's trading system. With a quarter of the world's population and its fastest-growing economy, China could and should be a magnet for our goods and services.

Even though American exports to China now are at an all-time high, so, too, is our trade deficit. In part, this is due to the strength of the American economy and to the fact that many products we used to buy in other Asian countries now are manufactured in China. But, clearly, an important part of the problem remains lack of access to China's markets.

We strongly support China's admission into the World Trade Organization. But in turn, China must dramatically improve access for foreign goods and services. We should be able to compete fully and fairly in China's marketplace, just as China competes in our own.

Tearing down trade barriers also is good for China and for the growth of China's neighbors and, therefore, for the stability and future of Asia. Next week, President Jiang and I will discuss steps China must take to join the WTO and assume its rightful place in the world economy.

**Finally**, the United States has a profound interest in ensuring that today's progress does not come at tomorrow's expense. Greenhouse gas emissions are leading to climate change. China is the fastest-growing contributor to greenhouse gas emissions, and we are the biggest greenhouse gas emitter. Soon, however, China will overtake the United States and become the largest contributor. Already, pollution has made respiratory disease the

number one health problem for China's people. Last March, when he visited China, Vice President Gore launched a joint forum with the Chinese on the environment and development so that we can work with China to pursue growth and protect the environment at the same time.

China has taken some important steps to deal with its need for more energy and cleaner air. Next week, President Jiang and I will talk about the next steps China can take to combat climate change. It is a global problem that must have a global solution that cannot come without China's participation, as well. We also will talk about what American companies and technology can do to support China in its efforts to reduce air pollution and increase clean energy production.

Progress in each of these areas will draw China into the institutions and arrangements that are setting the ground rules for the 21st century: the security partnerships; the open trade arrangements; the arms control regime; the multinational coalitions against terrorism, crime, and drugs; the commitments to preserve the environment and to uphold human rights. This is our best hope, to secure our own interests and values and to advance China's in the historic transformation that began 25 years ago, when China reopened to the world.

As we all know, the transformation already has produced truly impressive results. Twenty-five years ago, China stood apart from and closed to the international community. Now, China is a member of more than 1,000 international organizations—from the International Civil Aviation Organization to the International Fund for Agricultural Development. It has moved from the 22d-largest trading nation to the 11th. It is projected to become the second-largest trader, after the United States, by 2020. And today, 40,000 young Chinese are studying here in the United States, with hundreds of thousands more living and learning in Europe, Asia, Africa, and Latin America.

China's economic transformation has been even more radical. Market reforms have spurred more than two decades of unprecedented growth, and the decision at the recently ended 15th Party Congress to sell off most all of China's big, state-owned industries promises to keep China moving toward a market economy.

The number of people living in poverty has dropped from 250 million to 58 million, even as China's population has increased by nearly 350 million. Per capita income in the cities has jumped 550% in just the past decade.

As China has opened its economy, its people have enjoyed greater freedom of movement and choice of employment; better

schools and housing. Today, most Chinese enjoy a higher standard of living than at any time in China's modern history. But as China has opened economically, political reform has lagged behind.

Frustration in the West turned into condemnation after the terrible events in Tiananmen Square. Now, nearly a decade later, one of the great questions before the community of democracies is how to pursue the broad and complex range of our interests with China while urging and supporting China to move politically as well as economically into the 21st century. The great question for China is how to preserve stability, promote growth, and increase its influence in the world, while making room for the debate and the dissent that are a part of the fabric of all truly free and vibrant societies. The answer to those questions must begin with an understanding of the crossroads China has reached.

As China discards its old economic order, the scope and sweep of change has rekindled historic fears of chaos and disintegration. In return, Chinese leaders have worked hard to mobilize support, legitimize power, and hold the country together, which they see is essential to restoring the greatness of their nation and its rightful influence in the world. In the process, however, they have stifled political dissent to a degree and in ways that we believe are fundamentally wrong, even as freedom from want, freedom of movement, and local elections have increased.

This approach has caused problems within China and in its relationship to the United States. Chinese leaders believe it is necessary to hold the nation together, to keep it growing, to keep moving toward its destiny. But it will become increasingly difficult to maintain the closed political system in an ever-more open economy and society.

China's economic growth has made it more and more dependent on the outside world for investment, markets, and energy. Last year it was the second-largest recipient of foreign direct investment in the world. These linkages bring with them powerful forces for change. Computers and the Internet, fax machines and photocopiers, modems and satellites all increase the exposure to people, ideas, and the world beyond China's borders. The effect is only just beginning to be felt.

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Today, more than a billion Chinese have access to television, up from just 10 million two decades ago. Satellite dishes dot the landscape. They receive dozens of outside channels, including Chinese language services of CNN, Star TV, and Worldnet. Talk radio is increasingly popular and relatively unregulated in China's 1,000 radio stations. And 70% of China's students regularly listen to the Voice of America.

China's 2,200 newspapers, up from just 42 three decades ago, and more than 7,000 magazines and journals are more open in content. A decade ago, there were 50,000 mobile phones in China; now there are more than 7 million. The Internet already has 150,000 accounts in China, with more than a million expected to be on-line by the year 2000. The more ideas and information spread, the more people will expect to think for themselves, express their own opinions, and participate. And the more that happens, the harder it will be for their government to stand in their way.

Indeed, greater openness is profoundly in China's own interest. If welcomed, it will speed economic growth, enhance the world influence of China, and stabilize society. Without the full freedom to think, question, to create, China will be at a distinct disadvantage, competing with fully open societies in the information age where the greatest source of national wealth is what resides in the human mind.

China's creative potential is truly staggering. The largest population in the world is not yet among its top 15 patent powers. In an era where these human resources are what really matters, a country that holds its people back cannot achieve its full potential.

Our belief that, over time, growing interdependence would have a liberalizing effect in China does not mean in the meantime we should or we can ignore abuses in China of human rights or religious freedom. Nor does it mean that there is nothing we can do to speed the process of liberalization.

Americans share a fundamental conviction that people everywhere have the right to be treated with dignity, to give voice to their opinion, to choose their own leaders, to worship as they please. From Poland to South Africa, from Haiti to the Philippines, the democratic saga of the last decade proves that these are not American rights or Western rights or developed world rights, they are the birth-rights of every human being enshrined in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.

Those who fight for human rights and against religious persecution, at the risk of their jobs, their freedom, even their lives, find strength through knowledge that they are not

alone, that the community of democracies stands with them. The United States, therefore, must and will continue to stand up for human rights, to speak out against their abuse in China or anywhere else in the world. To do otherwise would run counter to everything we stand for as Americans.

Over the past year, our State Department's annual human rights report again pulled no punches on China. We cosponsored a resolution critical of China's human rights record in Geneva, even though many of our allies had abandoned the effort. We continue to speak against the arrest of dissidents and for a resumed dialogue with the Dalai Lama, on behalf of the people and the distinct culture and unique identity of the people of Tibet—not their political independence, but their uniqueness.

We established Radio Free Asia. We are working with Congress to expand its broadcast and to support civil society and the rule of law programs in China. We continue to pursue the problem of prison labor, and we regularly raise human rights in all our high-level meetings with the Chinese.

We do this in the hope of a dialogue. And in dialogue we must also admit that we in America are not blameless in our social fabric: Our crime rate is too high; too many of our children are still killed with guns; too many of our streets are still riddled with drugs. We have things to learn from other societies as well—and problems we have to solve. And if we expect other people to listen to us about the problems they have, we must be prepared to listen to them about the problems we have.

This pragmatic policy of engagement, of expanding our areas of cooperation with China while confronting our differences openly and respectfully—this is the best way to advance our fundamental interests and our values and to promote a more open and free China.

I know there are those who disagree. They insist that China's interests and America's are inexorably in conflict. They do not believe the Chinese system will continue to evolve in a way that elevates not only human material condition but the human spirit. They, therefore, believe we should be working harder to contain or even to confront China before it becomes even stronger.

I believe this view is wrong. Isolation of China is unworkable, counterproductive, and potentially dangerous. Military, political, and economic measures to do such a thing would find little support among our allies around the world and, more importantly, even among Chinese themselves working for greater liberty. Isolation would encourage the Chinese to

become hostile and to adopt policies of conflict with our own interests and values. It will eliminate, not facilitate, cooperation on weapons proliferation. It would hinder, not help, our efforts to foster stability in Asia. It would exacerbate, not ameliorate, the plight of dissidents. It would close off, not open up, one of the world's most important markets. It would make China less, not more, likely to play by the rules of international conduct and to be a part of an emerging international consensus.

As always, America must be prepared to live and flourish in a world in which we are at odds with China. But that is not the world we want. Our objective is not containment and conflict; it is cooperation. We will far better serve our interests and our principles if we work with a China that shares that objective with us.

Thirty years ago, President Richard Nixon, then a citizen campaigning for the job I now hold, called for a strategic change in our policy toward China. Taking the long view, he said, we simply cannot afford to leave China forever outside the family of nations. There is no place on this small planet for a billion of its potentially most able people to live in angry isolation.

Almost two decades ago, President Carter normalized relations with China, recognizing the wisdom of that statement. And over the

past two-and-a-half decades, as China has emerged from isolation, tensions with the West have decreased; cooperation has increased; prosperity has spread to more of China's people. The progress was a result of China's decision to play a more constructive role in the world and to open its economy. It was supported by a farsighted America policy that made clear to China we welcome its emergence as a great nation.

Now America must stay on that course of engagement. By working with China and making our differences clear where necessary, we can advance our interests and our values and China's historic transformation into a nation whose greatness is defined as much by its future as its past.

Change may not come as quickly as we would like, but, as our interests are long-term, so must our policies be. We have an opportunity to build a new century in which China takes its rightful place as a full and strong partner in the community of nations, working with the United States to advance peace and prosperity, freedom and security for both our people and for all the world. We have to take that chance.

Thank you very much. ■

*Secretary Albright*

# Fast-Track Trade Negotiating Authority: Essential for America

October 23, 1997

*Remarks at a joint appearance with Treasury Secretary Robert Rubin at the Chamber of Commerce, Washington, DC.*

Thank you, Mr. Donohue, and good afternoon to all of you. I am very pleased to be here along with Secretary Rubin to discuss what I consider to be the single-most important foreign policy decision Congress will make this year. That decision is whether to approve the Administration's request for renewal of traditional fast-track trade negotiating authority for the President.

This vote will signal to a watchful world whether America is approaching the end of the century with well-deserved confidence and pride or whether our deeper wish is to shrink from the center stage of world affairs.

This afternoon I would like to explain why I feel so strongly about this issue. I also want to mention at the outset that those of us who favor fast track must realize that we face a determined opposition, inspired by high-minded goals, going all out to make its case. If we're to prevail—as we must for the good of our country—we must respond seriously to the serious concerns of our critics, and we, too, must go all out to win.

Since taking office, I have stressed my belief that the United States has a historic opportunity to help bring the world closer together around basic principles of democracy, open markets, law, and a commitment to peace. If we seize this opportunity, we can ensure that our economy will continue to grow, our workers will have access to better jobs, and our leadership will be felt wherever U.S. interests are engaged. We will also fuel an expanding global economy and give more countries a stake in the international system, thereby denying nourishment to the forces of extremist violence that feed on depravation across our planet.

As Secretary Rubin will explain in greater detail [Visit the Treasury Department's web site at [www.ustreas.gov](http://www.ustreas.gov)], the Administration's efforts to promote the cause of open trade and open economies has done much to fuel the remarkable period of sustained economic

growth we have enjoyed these past five years. But if we're to continue up this ladder, Congress must say yes to fast track.

There are many opposed to this step. They argue that free trade creates a bidding war in which foreign countries compete by lowering labor and environmental standards, thereby luring U.S. factories and jobs offshore. But the truth is that we already have free trade. Unfortunately, that freedom tends to run one way. On the average, U.S. tariffs are far lower than those of other countries. This means that when we reach a free trade agreement, the other country has to cut tariffs by more than we do. That's not only free trade; that's fair trade, and that's good for America.

Another flaw in the rationale of fast track opponents is that voting down fast track won't accomplish anything for American workers. It won't result in higher labor standards overseas; it won't result in higher environmental standards. These are issues that can only be dealt with through international cooperation and negotiation.

The best course for our nation is not to curse globalization but to shape it. Because we have the world's most competitive economy and its most productive work force, we're better positioned than any other nation to do so.

Both the proponents and opponents of fast track want a strong American economy that creates good jobs and rising standards of living for our people. But we, who support fast track, do not believe that continued economic growth will just happen. We believe it must be helped along by trade agreements that lower tariffs and create access to new markets.

Opponents of fast track appear to suggest that we will be better off if we leave the business of negotiating trade agreements to others. But it's hard to see how. As others forge agreements and expand trade, we will face barriers, including higher tariffs, that our competitors do not. That's like trying to run the

bases in the World Series with the field tilted uphill against us. I will switch to football analyses next week.

I was disturbed, as I believe all Americans should be, to learn of a senior European official boasting recently about Europe's expanded trade with South America, and saying that, "We are stomping all over" America's "backyard." That is unacceptable, but it is what happens when the United States engages in unilateral disarmament on trade.

The authority for a President to negotiate tariff reductions goes back as far as Franklin Roosevelt's first term when his administration sought to reduce the damage caused by the Smoot-Hawley Act. Fast track, itself, has been available and used to America's economic benefit by every president for the past two decades.

But the current debate is about more than dollars and cents. Fast track is a foreign policy imperative. It is indispensable to U.S. economic leadership, and that leadership is indispensable to U.S. influence around the globe. American prestige and power are not divisible. If we want our views and interests respected, we cannot sit on the sideline with a towel over our heads while others make the trade and investment plays that will determine the economic standings of the 21<sup>st</sup> century.

In many capitals, if we have nothing to say on trade, we will find it harder to have productive discussions on other issues of direct importance to American interests. This was brought home to me yet again during my trips with the President to South and Central America and the Caribbean. Here our initiatives on trade are a vital part of a larger process of cooperation that includes the fight against narcotics trafficking, crime, pollution, illegal immigration, and other threats to the well-being of our citizens.

We should not forget that for decades during the Cold War, we Americans spread the gospel of competition, free enterprise, and open markets. Today, people and governments almost everywhere are converting to that faith. This trend is paying off in the emergence of large, educated middle classes in many developing nations, leading in turn to new pressure for decent wages, environmental protection, and greater democracy. But make no mistake: People around the world will be watching the fast track debate closely to see whether Americans will continue to practice what we have so long preached.

As we plan for the future, we cannot simply assume that the current democratic trends will continue. If we fail to approve fast track, we will embolden opponents of economic reform throughout the world. We will send the message that market freedom is to be feared and avoided. Rejection of fast track could set in motion a chain reaction of protectionism that would endanger our economic future and halt the spread of political freedom.

If Congress approves fast track, our competitive economy and skilled work force should ensure that the prosperity we have enjoyed in recent years will be sustained. But if Congress votes fast track down, we will suffer a major setback to our economic future and a damaging and self-inflicted blow to American influence. That is why I have joined every living former Secretary of State in asking Congress to be true to America's own philosophy—to approve fast track and to pave the way for continued prosperity at home and leadership abroad.

For more than half a century, the United States has played the leading role within the international system. Not as sole arbiter of right and wrong—for that is a responsibility widely shared—but as pathfinder, as the nation able to show the way when others cannot. Our predecessors had the foresight to forge alliances such as NATO, institutions such as the World Bank, and initiatives such as the Marshall Plan to defend freedom and build prosperity. And they did so on a bipartisan basis.

Today, under President Clinton, we are constructing a new framework to address the challenges of our time, based on principles that will endure for all time. This Saturday, on the far side of midnight, those who yearn for days gone by will celebrate the only real opportunity they have this year to turn back the clock. The rest of us will use the extra hour of daylight saving time which it provides to prepare—whether through sleep or study—for the future.

The United States is not a slow track society. We have a responsibility in our time, as our predecessors had in theirs, not to be prisoners of history, but to shape history—to look ahead; to harness, not hide from the winds of change; and to use every means at our disposal to build a better world for our children and for generations to come.

Thank you very much. ■

*Secretary Albright*

# American Foreign Policy and the Search for Religious Freedom

October 23, 1997

*Remarks at the Columbus School of Law, The Catholic University, Washington, DC.*

Thank you very much, Dean Dobranski, for that introduction. And President Larson, thank you very much for that present. I have to open the Marine Marathon this weekend, and now I know what I can wear.

Faculty, students, guests, and friends: Good afternoon. It is a pleasure to join with you in observing the centennial of Catholic University's Columbus School of Law. During the past few years, it seems we have celebrated the 50th anniversary of everything from D-Day to the founding of the United Nations to the Marshall Plan. So it's nice to know that there's something—besides myself—that is more than 50 years old. It is also nice to know that in a year when the fighting Irish are having their troubles, the fighting Cardinals are 7-0.

Obviously, much has changed since the first half-dozen students took their initial classes here: In 1897, gold had just been discovered in the Yukon; the first subway in the United States was being completed in Boston; William McKinley was the President; and the United States Secretary of State had a beard.

It was also a time when the prevailing mood in our country and around the world was one of anticipation and hope. Our grandparents and their parents looked out upon a world being brought closer together by such amazing inventions as the motor car, the telephone, and the electric light.

Diplomats gathered at The Hague were expanding the scope of international humanitarian law. And editorial writers were looking ahead to the new century and predicting an era of unprecedented peace and good will. There followed two world wars, several attempted genocides, the Holocaust, and the bloodiest 100 years in human history.

Today, we, too, are about to begin a new century. We, too, live in a hopeful era of relative peace and startling technological change. And as we look to the future, we know that we, too, will be tested by the clash

between what is the best and worst in human character; between our most selfish and aggressive instincts and what Abraham Lincoln referred to as the better angels of our nature.

This contest will be engaged on many fronts, and it will have many elements. Today, I'd like to focus on one that has been increasingly in the news lately and that I believe will continue to play a significant role in U.S. foreign policy and in the affairs of the world. That is the ceaseless quest for religious freedom and tolerance.

In the United States, we believe in the separation of church and state. Our Constitution reflects the fear of religious persecution that prompted many in the 17th and 18th centuries to set sail for American shores. But this principle has never blinded us to religion's impact on secular events, whether for the worse, as when intolerance contributes to conflict and strife; or for the better, as when faith serves as a source of moral inspiration and healing.

There are many examples of the latter in recent years, thanks to leaders of many faiths from many lands, including the efforts of the Ecumenical Patriarch Bartholomew on behalf of the environment and inter-ethnic understanding; the eloquence of Archbishop Tutu in helping to consign apartheid to the dustbin of history; the inspiring and culturally transcending ministry of Mother Teresa; and most dramatically, the historic contributions made by Pope John Paul II to the cause of freedom.

As a native of central Europe, and as a professor who has lectured on the region, I will never forget the impact of the Pope's visit to his native Poland while the nation was still behind the Iron Curtain and under martial law. Those visits were arranged by the church and not the state. And the outpouring of enthusiasm astonished the government, which had assumed that years of dictatorship had caused religious faith to erode. They were wrong; for rarely has a message so important found such a

receptive audience. And never has a people been made aware so suddenly of their own inner feelings and collective strength.

His Holiness argued that if people are to fulfill their responsibility to live according to moral principles, they must first have the right and ability to do so. In this spirit, he spoke with carefully chosen words of the need for solidarity with workers and among all human beings. In this spirit, he challenged the dogmas of the communist system, which denied to millions the right to speak freely and to participate in shaping the social and political systems of their societies. In this spirit, he challenged the artificial division that Stalin had imposed by reasserting the fundamental unity of Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals. And in this way, he helped unleash a tidal wave of intellectual renewal and personal courage that helped bring down the Berlin Wall and transform the face of the world.

Now as we strive to shape this new era, it is an important part of American policy to promote greater freedom of religion and to encourage reconciliation among religious groups. We take this stand because it is consistent with our values, and because it is one of the reasons people around the world have chosen at critical times in this century to stand with us. We believe that nations are stronger, and the lives of their people richer, when citizens have the freedom to choose, proclaim, and exercise their religious identity.

We have also learned that the denial of religious freedom or threats to it can cause fear, flight, fighting, and even all-out war. So we have developed a focus in our policy on regions where religious divisions have combined with other factors to engender violence or endanger peace. To implement our policy, we have publicly identified the promotion of religious freedom as a foreign policy priority.

**First**, I have instructed U.S. diplomats to provide frequent and thorough reports on the status of religious freedom in the countries to which they are accredited.

**Second**, we have intensified the spotlight given to religious freedom in the reports we issue annually on human rights practices around the world.

**Third**, we are modifying our procedures for reviewing requests for political asylum to ensure that those fleeing religious persecution are treated fairly.

**Fourth**, we promote religious freedom through our foreign broadcasting, by sponsoring programs and exchanges that foster understanding, and through our work in international organizations such as the UN Human Rights Commission and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe.

**Fifth**, we often raise issues related to religious freedom with foreign governments and their representatives. That was the case, for example, earlier this year when I discussed restrictions on religious activity in Vietnam and, more recently, when President Clinton raised with President Yeltsin our serious concerns about Russia's new law on religion. Next week, during the U.S.-China summit, we will be stressing to President Jiang Zemin the importance of respecting the religious heritage of the people of Tibet and of ensuring that China's growing Christian community is allowed to worship freely, without harassment or intimidation.

**Finally**, we reinforced our commitment to religious tolerance last winter when my predecessor, Warren Christopher, established an Advisory Committee on Religious Freedom Abroad. The committee includes distinguished scholars, activists, and religious leaders representing the major spiritual traditions in the United States. Its purpose is to help direct attention to the problem of religious persecution abroad and to provide advice on how to achieve reconciliation in areas now sundered by religious enmity. In February, I chaired the first meeting of the committee, and I look forward to its recommendations and observations later this year.

As we proceed with our efforts to promote religious freedom, we should be mindful of one danger, which is the possibility that—as we pursue the right goal—we may choose the wrong means. For example, legislation has been introduced in Congress that would create a White House office for religious persecution monitoring that would automatically impose sanctions against countries where religious freedoms are not fully observed.

Although well-intentioned, this bill would create an artificial hierarchy among human rights with the right to be free from torture and murder shoved along with others into second place. It would also establish a new and unneeded bureaucracy and deprive U.S. officials of the flexibility required to protect the overall foreign policy interests of the United States.

I have said many times—for I believe it in my heart and have experienced it in my life—that the United States is the greatest and most generous nation on the face of the earth. But even the most patriotic among us must admit that neither morality, nor religious freedom, nor respect for human rights, were invented here—nor are they perfectly practiced here.

It is in our interest, and it is essential to our own identity, for America to promote religious freedom and human rights. But if we are to be effective in defending the values we cherish, we

must also take into account the perspectives and values of others. We must recognize that our relations with the world are not fully encompassed by any single issue or set of issues. And we must do all we can to ensure that the world's attention is focused on the principles we embrace, not diverted by the methods we use.

Perhaps the clearest intersection between American interests and the principle of religious tolerance occurs in regions where ethnic and religious differences contribute to division and the risk of violence. Here, the United States works to persuade parties of their mutual stake

in learning to get along and their mutual responsibility for doing so. For example, President Clinton has been personally involved in encouraging multi-party talks aimed at achieving a durable settlement to the dispute in Northern Ireland.

Those talks resumed recently, following a cease-fire declaration by the IRA, which shares with Unionist paramilitary groups the responsibility for maintaining a climate of nonviolence. We are very proud of the role that former Senator George Mitchell has played in establishing the framework for discussion. And we will continue to support ecumenical initiatives aimed at bridging differences between the Catholic and

Protestant communities—and at addressing long-standing problems of economic inequity and discrimination.

In Bosnia, we are working to promote reconciliation in a land that has literally been torn apart by conflict among three communities of differing ethnicity and religious faith. To that end, we have reinvigorated our commitment to the implementation of the Dayton peace accords. And although many serious obstacles remain, we have made significant progress in recent months. For example, municipal elections have been held, and it is clear from the results that many Bosnians do not want, and will not accept, a country permanently frozen along ethnic lines. They want to go home and, in fact, the return of refugees and displaced persons has increased.

In addition, the cause of justice received a boost earlier this month when 10 persons indicted for war crimes surrendered to the tribunal in The Hague. The cause of security has benefited from the destruction of thousands of heavy weapons. The cause of truth has been served by a substantial increase in independent television and radio broadcasting. The cause of prosperity is gaining ground in those communities that are implementing the Dayton accords. And the goal of reconciliation is being advanced by the emergence of a new leader of the Bosnian Serbs, who appears to understand that implementing Dayton is the key to a decent future for her people.

Many Americans, when they think of Sarajevo, may remember the Olympics held there in 1984. But the Sarajevo of that time was also the ecumenical city—host to mosques, churches—both Catholic and Orthodox—and synagogues, as well. So when cynics suggest that the people of Bosnia cannot live together, I can only say but they did, they have, they must, and they will again.

In building peace, momentum matters. So I was encouraged by the Pope's visit in April to Sarajevo where he delivered a passionate plea for reconciliation and inter-ethnic healing. I was pleased by the decision in June of the leaders of the faith communities in Bosnia to create a joint council to promote respect for human rights and to issue a Statement of Shared Moral Commitment. And I welcome the address earlier this month by the new Archbishop of Zagreb, who expressed warmth toward the leaders of other faiths in his country and cited the need for, and I quote, "The people of spirit who will bring understanding, negotiations, and peace to an excessively radicalized and tense public life."

Community and religious leaders play a vital role in Bosnia and throughout the Balkans; for the ethnic hatred that splintered that region was not a natural phenomenon. It was not something in the water or a virus carried through the air; rather, it was injected into the informational bloodstream. It was taught, published, broadcast, and yes, even preached over and over again. And the fears aroused were manipulated by ruthless leaders for the purpose of enhancing their own position, power, and wealth. The physical and psychological wounds that resulted from the devastation of Bosnia were deep and will take time and treatment to heal. The United States has made a commitment, which we should keep, to assist and persist in that healing process.

There are some who see in the rivalries that exist in the Balkans and elsewhere—in the Middle East, the Gulf, Africa, and Asia—the potential for a vast clash of civilizations, in

*"We must recognize that our relations with the world are not fully encompassed by any single issue or set of issues. And we must do all we can to ensure that the world's attention is focused on the principles we embrace, not diverted by the methods we use."*

which differences not only of spiritual tradition but of culture, history, and ideology divide the world into bitter contending camps. The United States has a different view.

We are the defender of no one faith, but the respecter of all and of the right of all to proclaim and exercise faith. We are friends with nations in which the predominant religion is Buddhist, and others where it is Christian or Hindu or Islamic or Jewish. We are, ourselves, a nation of all these faiths and more, and of those without religious faith and of those within whom such faith and doubt engage in constant struggle.

In our policy toward other nations, we do not act or judge on the basis of religion or cultural tradition, but on behavior, on compliance with international norms. And when those norms are not observed, we express our opposition to the acts in question, not to the religion of those involved.

For this reason, we reject stereotypes; for we know that actions in violation of international standards, including extremist violence and terror, are not the province of any particular religion, culture, or part of the world.

In recent years, we have seen bloody acts of terrorism committed by Hindu separatists in Sri Lanka and Kurdish separatists in Turkey. We have seen a Jewish man who had been raised in the United States murder 29 Arabs while they were at prayer in a Hebron mosque. We have seen a Japanese cult release poison gas in the Tokyo subway. We have seen Islamic suicide bombers destroy the lives of people riding on buses or shopping in the streets of Jerusalem. We have seen extremists engaged in a grisly campaign of terror against their co-religionists in Algeria. And we have heard Serbian leaders justify the campaign of ethnic cleansing and mass rape inflicted upon Muslims in Bosnia as a defense, in their words, of "Christian Europe."

Clearly, the central conflict in the world today is not between the adherents of one religion or culture and another; rather, it is between those of all cultures and faiths who believe in law, want peace, and embrace tolerance and those driven, whether by ambition, desperation, or hate to commit acts of aggression and terror. The great divide now is not between east and west or north and south, but between those imprisoned by history and those determined to shape history.

Almost half a century ago, the nations of the world enshrined in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights the principle that every person has the right to freedom of thought, conscience, and religion. To those who argue that the Universal Declaration reflects Western values alone, I would point to the first Afro-Asian Solidarity Conference held in Indonesia more than four decades ago. There, the representatives of 29 nations from China to Saudi Arabia and from Sudan and Libya to Iran and Iraq cited the Universal Declaration as "a common standard of achievement for all peoples and all nations." And countries on every continent reaffirmed the Declaration just four years ago at the Vienna Conference on Human Rights.

Today, our great opportunity in the aftermath of Cold War and the divisions is to bring the world closer together around shared principles of democracy, open markets, law, human rights, and a commitment to peace.

For almost as many years as I have been alive, the United States has played the leading role within the international system; not as sole arbiter of right and wrong, for that is a responsibility widely shared, but as pathfinder—as the nation able to show the way when others cannot. Now, we have reached a point in history when no nation need be left out of the global system, and every nation that seeks to participate and is willing to do all it can to aid itself will have our help in finding the right path.

In that effort, religious freedom and tolerance are among the great principles we strive to defend. By so doing, we maintain the vigor of our own freedoms; we serve our interest in a world where civilizations cooperate and communicate instead of clash and collide; and we honor not one, but all of the great spiritual traditions that lend meaning to our time here on earth.

By teaching the rule of law and broadening the horizons of a new generation of leaders, this great school of law and this fine Catholic University are contributing to the goals of freedom and tolerance upon which our future depends. For that, I congratulate you. I wish you another 100 years, at least, of prosperity and progress. And for the invitation to speak today, I thank you very much. ■

*Secretary Albright*

# NATO Expansion: A Shared And Sensible Investment

October 21, 1997

*Statement before the Senate Appropriations Committee,  
Washington, DC.*

Mr. Chairman, members of the committee: I am very pleased to come before you today, together with Secretary Cohen, to urge your support for the admission of the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland to NATO.

This initiative is the culmination of years of hard work—by the United States, by NATO, and by the new democracies that wish to join our alliance. All 16 NATO leaders have approved it. Many Members of Congress have urged it.

Now the process of advice and consent has begun, and the fate of NATO enlargement is in your hands. Our friends in Europe and around the world are watching you; for they know that the United States is unique in the power our constitutional system grants to the Senate over foreign policy, especially over treaties.

I welcome this, because I know that the commitment NATO enlargement entails will only be meaningful if the American people and their representatives understand and accept it. That is why I am glad, Mr. Chairman, that you have begun these hearings at such an early stage in the process and why I am happy that you will be joined in your examination by the Foreign Relations, Budget, and Armed Services Committees; by the NATO Observers' Group; and by the House of Representatives.

I am hopeful that with your support, and after the full national debate to which these hearings will contribute, the Senate will embrace the addition of new members to NATO. I also know that before you decide, the Administration must continue to address many questions.

As appropriators, you will be highly focused, and rightly so, on the issue of costs. And as appropriators, I know you believe that the cost of any public initiative must be justified by its benefits. I want to explain today how America will benefit from the investment we ask you to make and why I believe the costs will be reasonable and equitably shared.

Let me begin by asking you to recall the situation America faced in the world during the first year of this decade. The Cold War had ended. Our nation would no longer face a single, overriding threat concentrated along a well-defined frontier in Europe. Many people wondered—and I know this is one of your concerns, Mr. Chairman—whether we needed to continue paying such close attention to Europe and NATO in the face of new challenges and opportunities in Asia. But we did not lose sight of our interests across the Atlantic. Two world wars in this century already taught us that when Europe and America stand apart, we always pay a terrible price. What is more, we recognized that the triumph of freedom in Europe did not mean we could take its security for granted.

Before long, we saw Russia, with our help, build the foundations of a modern market democracy, but we knew and still know that its success is not assured. We saw war and genocide spread across the former Yugoslavia; only our leadership of a NATO coalition put an end to that horror. On Europe's horizon, we saw rogue states develop dangerous weapons that might have our allies within their range and in their sights. We knew enough from history and human experience to know that a grave threat, if allowed to arise, would arise.

In that first year of the post-Cold War era, another event proved the importance of our transatlantic partnership. American troops were sent to the Gulf to lead a coalition against a tyrant's aggression. And with us stood soldiers, sailors, and aviators from virtually all our NATO allies—joined, I might add, by men and women from some of the brand new democracies of central Europe. We were reminded then that when we are faced with new challenges, it helps to have old friends at our side.

If a serious challenge were to develop in Asia or elsewhere, Mr. Chairman, the last thing we would need is instability in Europe—and the first thing we would want is for our European allies and partners to stand with us. Indeed, whatever challenges the future may bring, it will be in our interest to have a vigorous and larger alliance with those European democracies that share our values and our determination to defend them. It is that conviction we ask you to embrace today.

We recognize that NATO expansion involves a solemn expansion of American responsibilities in Europe. As Americans we take our commitments seriously, and we do not extend them lightly. Any major extension of American commitments must advance our fundamental national interests. Let me explain specifically why welcoming the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland into NATO meets that test.

**First**, a larger NATO will make us safer by expanding the area in Europe where wars simply do not happen. This is the productive paradox at NATO's heart. By making clear that we will fight, if necessary, to defend our allies, we make it less likely that our troops will ever be called upon to do so.

Now you may say that no part of Europe faces any immediate threat of armed attack today. That is true for the first time in all of European history—in part because the existence of NATO has helped deter such a threat. And the purpose of NATO enlargement is to keep it that way. It is also fair to ask if our interest in preventing war in central Europe is vital enough to justify a security commitment. Some imply it is not. But let us not deceive ourselves.

The United States is a European power. If we have an interest in the lands west of the Oder River, then we surely have an interest in the fate of the 200 million people who live in the nations between the Baltic and Black Seas. We waged the Cold War in part because these nations were held captive. We fought World War II in part because they had been invaded. We know that half a continent cannot be secure if the other half is in turmoil.

Now that the nations of central Europe are free, we want them to succeed, and we want them to be safe. For if there were a major threat to the security of their region, if we were to wake up one morning to the sight of cities being shelled and borders being overrun, I am certain we would choose to act, enlargement or no enlargement. Expanding NATO now is simply the surest way to prevent that kind of threat from arising and, thus, the need to make that kind of choice.

Mr. Chairman, the **second** reason why enlargement passes the test of national interest is that it will make NATO stronger and more cohesive. The Poles, Hungarians, and Czechs are passionately committed to NATO and fully accept its principles of shared responsibility. Experience has taught them to believe in a strong American leadership role in Europe. Their forces have already risked their lives alongside ours from the Gulf War to Bosnia. Recently, Czech soldiers joined our British allies in securing a police station from heavily armed Bosnian Serb extremists.

When the President went to the Madrid summit in July, he insisted that NATO invite only the strongest candidates to join now. We settled on three nations that will make a tangible military contribution to the alliance, three nations that have been our dependable partners ever since they won their freedom—from the fight against nuclear proliferation, to our effort to reform the UN, to our support for human rights—three nations that will be good allies.

Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic do not look at NATO as a one-way street of reassurance. They are asking to assume the obligations of mature democratic statehood and to start taking responsibility for the freedom and security of others. That is an offer we should not refuse.

Mr. Chairman, the **third** reason why a larger NATO serves our interests is that the very promise of it gives the nations of central and eastern Europe an incentive to solve their own problems. To align themselves with NATO, aspiring countries have strengthened their democratic institutions. They have made sure that soldiers answer to civilians, not the other way around. They have signed 10 major accords that taken together resolve virtually every potential ethnic and border dispute in the region.

I know that some of you have been concerned that a larger NATO might involve us in border and ethnic conflicts such as the one in Bosnia. On the contrary. The decision to expand the alliance has encouraged the resolution of exactly the kind of disputes that might have led to future Bosnias. In fact, the three states we have invited to join NATO have resolved every potential problem of this type.

I have been a student of central European history, and I have lived some of it myself. When I see Romanians and Hungarians building a genuine friendship after centuries of enmity; when I see Poles, Ukrainians, and Lithuanians forming joint military units after years of suspicion; when I see Czechs and

Germans overcoming decades of mistrust; when I see central Europeans confident enough to improve their political and economic ties with Russia; I know something remarkable is happening.

NATO is doing for Europe's east precisely what it did for Europe's west after World War II. It is helping to vanquish old hatreds, to promote integration and to create a secure environment for economic prosperity.

This is another reminder that the contingencies we do not want our troops to face, such as ethnic conflict, border skirmishes, and social unrest are far more easily avoided with NATO enlargement than

without it. And if such contingencies were to arise, let me remind you that NATO operates by consensus, and that the NATO Treaty preserves a role for our judgment and constitutional process in deciding how to respond.

In short, Mr. Chairman, a larger NATO will make America safer, NATO stronger, and Europe more peaceful and united. That is the strategic rationale. But I would be disingenuous if I did not tell you I see a moral imperative as well. Indeed, there is no contradiction here between realism and idealism, between pragmatism and principle, between security and justice.

NATO defines a community of interest among the free nations of North America and Europe that both preceded and outlasted

the Cold War. America has long stood for the proposition that this Atlantic community should not be artificially divided and that its nations should be free to shape their destiny. We should also think about what would happen if we were to turn new applicants away. That would mean freezing NATO at its Cold War membership and preserving the old Iron Curtain as its eastern frontier. It would mean locking out a whole group of otherwise

qualified democracies simply because they were once, against their will, members of the Warsaw Pact.

Why would America choose to be allied with Europe's old democracies forever but its new democracies never? There is no acceptable answer to that question. Instead, it would probably be said that we blocked the aspirations of our would-be allies because Russia objected. And that, in turn, could cause confidence to crumble in central Europe, leading to a search for security by other means, including arms buildups and competition among neighbors. This would be the price—the very high price—of not enlarging NATO.

We have chosen a better way. We have chosen to look at the landscape of the new Europe and to ask a simple question: Which of these nations that are so clearly important to our security are ready and able to contribute to our security? The answer to that question is before the Senate, awaiting your affirmation.

Mr. Chairman, I know I do not need to tell you that our security has never come without a price. So let me address the very real costs that this initiative will entail.

Last February, at the behest of Congress and before we had decided which nations to invite to membership, the Administration made a preliminary estimate of the total costs of a larger NATO. We projected how much our new allies would need to spend to adapt and modernize their militaries, the investments our old allies would need to make to extend security commitments eastward, as well as the direct costs related to enlargement, including those that would be covered by NATO's three common funded budgets.

Since then, we have settled on three candidates, and we are gaining a much clearer understanding of the capabilities they will bring to the alliance. NATO staff are now assessing the resource implications of enlargement for NATO's common funded budgets—civil, military, and infrastructure. That assessment will be submitted to us and the other NATO ministers for approval at the December ministerial meeting of the North Atlantic Council. This process is important because the conclusions it reaches about the commonly funded cost of enlargement will represent more than just another estimate. They will represent a commitment.

NATO is also engaged in an intensive effort to determine the level of forces our current and future allies will need to put at the disposal of the alliance to meet their new commitments. The NATO cost study will not place a price tag on these military improvements, which are

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national responsibilities. But the requirements it defines will be part of NATO's next round of force planning, which will begin next spring. I can assure you that we will continue to approach this process with several basic principles in mind.

The first and most important principle is that the amount we and our allies pay for a larger NATO must be a function of concrete military requirements. Our discussion in these hearings, and our consultations with our allies, should focus on defining the level of military capability we want our old and new allies to have in this changed security environment, and then making sure that they commit to that level. This may seem counterintuitive, Mr. Chairman, but it now appears, as we examine the assets and infrastructure our new allies bring to NATO, that the commonly funded cost of integrating their armed forces will turn out to be lower than we estimated in February.

Either way, the deciding factor will be bang, not buck. If we can integrate these nations into the alliance, maintain NATO's capabilities, and acquire the new ones we need at a lower cost than we expected, that will be good news. But we must also be wary of false economies and spend no less than we need to keep NATO strong. We will not shortchange NATO's effectiveness or its necessary investments in military readiness. Even as we work to ensure this initiative does not cost too much, we will also be careful that it does not end up costing too little.

A second principle is that costs within NATO's common funded budget must be equitably shared. The United States pays about 25% of these costs. That will not change. Our allies pay roughly three-fourths of NATO's costs today. And that will still be the case in a larger alliance, as old and new allies will pay 75% of the common funded costs.

A third principle is that each ally, old and new, must do its share at home to meet its military obligations to NATO and to preserve the credibility of NATO's security guarantees. NATO's members contribute in many different ways—from the United States, with our unequalled military arsenal, to Iceland, which provides bases, but no army. Still, NATO is a collective defense alliance. We need to know that at moments of crisis, each member will be able to deliver on its commitment to help defend new allies.

Mr. Chairman, the President, Secretary Cohen, and I have been making these points loud and clear to our current and future allies. Our message has been received. As a result, I am confident that the costs of a larger alliance

will be real, but affordable, and that NATO will emerge from this process with its military capabilities as strong and credible as ever. Let me explain why I feel so confident, with respect to our new and old allies alike.

First of all, I know many of you are worried that Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic may not be able to pull their weight in NATO. As we all know, just 10 years ago they were members of the Warsaw Pact. Their militaries are not as advanced as those of most NATO allies.

I know that you, Mr. Chairman, have expressed concern that we will have to fund a massive program of assistance to help these countries meet their new obligations, just as we used the Marshall Plan and military assistance to help our original NATO allies a half-century ago. I can assure you this will not be necessary. These countries do not face the kind of threat our allies faced in the 1950s. They have time to achieve a mature military capability. After taking a hard look at what they already bring to the table, we have no doubt they are on their way to meeting that goal.

What is more, these are not ruined nations recovering from the devastation of a hot war. If you go to Budapest, Prague, and Warsaw you will see some of the most vibrant economies in Europe. These economies have grown by an annual average of 4% in the last three years, and that trend is likely to continue for some time. Each of these nations is a member of the OECD, which admits only the most-advanced industrial economies. Each has graduated—or is about to graduate—from our SEED aid program, because they just don't need that kind of help anymore.

In fact, Poland now funds its own military assistance program to support its neighbors, Ukraine and Lithuania. It has expanded its global responsibilities by joining KEDO, which funds the dismantlement of North Korea's nuclear weapons program. All three of these nations have paid their own way to send troops to Bosnia and to other trouble spots in Africa, Latin America, and Asia. All three have pledged to increase the percentage of GDP they spend on their armed forces. And we have seen clear signs that all three have the political will to carry out that commitment.

Poland already has the most advanced armed forces in the region. The Polish Government recently unveiled a 15-year defense plan, which includes substantial resources for further modernization. There was no controversy whatsoever on this issue during Poland's recent election campaign.

The Czech Government has pledged to increase defense spending by .1% of GDP a year for the next three years. It recently unveiled a new budget that completely fulfills that commitment, and it did so after this summer's costly flooding disaster. As a result, Czech defense spending will rise by 17% next year—about the equivalent of a one-year, \$40-billion increase in America's defense budget. The Czech Republic still has much work to do, but it is clearly committed to getting the job done.

Hungary has also committed to increase defense spending by .1% of GDP a year over the next five years. And while Hungary may not yet be in NATO, NATO is already in Hungary. More than 100,000 American troops have passed through NATO bases in that country on their way in or out of Bosnia. The Hungarian Parliament approved NATO's request to use Hungarian territory within 72 hours of being asked. Without hesitation, Hungary has fulfilled its responsibilities as the supply lifeline for the largest and most complex deployment in NATO's history.

Some people have argued that these new democracies should not be asked to bear additional military burdens at a time when they are still undergoing difficult economic transformations. But these nations plan to spend roughly 2% of GDP on defense, a figure in line with the defense burden shouldered by many NATO countries, and one that their dynamic economies can readily sustain without neglecting other priorities. They will be modernizing their armed forces in any case, and they understand that in the long run, it will be cheaper to do so within NATO than outside it. NATO's prospective members know they will not have to fend for themselves if peace is threatened in their region. This gives them a reason to avoid mortgaging their future on the arms market. In fact, it has already given them the confidence to support new limits on conventional arms in central Europe.

Ultimately, only the people of these countries can decide what is best for their future. Today, in all three, solid public majorities and every mainstream party support membership in NATO. They are telling us they see no contradiction between security and prosperity, and we should not substitute our judgment for theirs.

Mr. Chairman and Members, I know that many of you are equally concerned, if not more so, about the willingness of our old allies to meet their commitments to a larger NATO. Many of our west European allies

are facing economic difficulties of their own. Many are reducing public spending so they can participate in a single European currency.

Fiscal constraints are well known to this committee. But when the 16 allied leaders gathered in Madrid in July, they made a commitment. They stated clearly in their final communique that a larger NATO would carry costs, that those costs would be manageable, and that they would be met.

I am confident that our allies will pay their fair share of the commonly funded costs of enlargement because we are going to determine those costs together. NATO's history gives us ample reason to believe that once we set a long-term goal together, we will meet it together.

As for our allies' national defense spending, that is something that we obviously cannot control. But they understand the need to ensure that their armed forces can meet the new commitments NATO is taking on. What is more, some of the costs we expect our allies to incur would need to be faced even if NATO were not growing, since they would in any case have to adapt their power projection capabilities to meet new challenges. Enlargement simply underscores the issue. So I believe that over time they can and will take the necessary steps.

I am confident that our allies are not going to be free riders on American leadership in central and eastern Europe because, frankly, up to this point they have not been. The west European countries have committed over \$80 billion to support the central European democracies through the end of the decade. The European Union has invited five central European countries, including two that are not being considered for NATO membership, to begin the process of joining its ranks. America's efforts on behalf of democracy and peace in the world are unparalleled, but in this region our European allies are making substantial contributions.

Our European allies' commitment to the cause of a larger, stronger NATO is as deep as ours, and that is no surprise. They need this alliance. They provide the majority of its ground troops. Over the course of history, they have provided the battlefield. They have the greatest possible stake in seeing our initiative succeed.

Mr. Chairman, those are my reasons for confidence. I base my assessment on my experience as Secretary of State in dealing with our current and future allies in Europe, as well as on the experience of a lifetime before that. I base it on my best judgment of what the immediate future may bring. But you know, there is one piece of equipment that I do not have at the State Department, although I hope one day the Appropriations Committee will fund it—and that is a

crystal ball. None of us can know precisely what challenges we will be facing in Europe 10 or 20 or 50 years down the road.

As you know, President Clinton has pledged that the process of enlargement will continue after 1999. A new round of enlargement will carry cost implications that we cannot predict today. I can assure you, however, that the Senate would still have to ratify the admission of any additional members. Any new costs would have to be approved by the entire Congress.

I understand that for the Congress, our experience in Bosnia introduces another element of uncertainty. I acknowledge that our mission in that country has cost more than the Administration originally estimated. But I honestly believe that the circumstances of NATO enlargement are different.

It is intrinsically difficult to predict the cost of an overseas military deployment in a potentially hostile setting. It is virtually impossible to plan for every contingency. Once our troops are on the ground, we have a moral obligation to give them the support they need, even if it exceeds our original expectations. The costs of NATO enlargement, on the other hand, are more straightforward; they are budgeted in advance, and we have a veto. We do not run our alliance on supplemental appropriations.

I know history offers other reasons to doubt our ability to predict future costs. You have reminded us, Mr. Chairman, that when NATO was created, Secretary of State Acheson was asked by Senator Hickenlooper of Iowa if it would require the permanent stationing of American troops in Europe. He replied it would not. Today, you understandably fear that history will repeat itself.

If you were to ask me today whether our continuing commitment to NATO requires the continued stationing of U.S. troops in Europe, my answer would be yes. We made that decision decades ago and reaffirmed it after the Cold War. If you were to ask me if our commitment to a larger NATO will require expanding our military presence across the Atlantic, my answer would be that in the current and foreseeable security environment in Europe, we simply see no need and nor do our future allies.

But I agree that this story is instructive. It helps us remember that when we decided to keep our troops in Europe in the 1950s, it was not just to meet a formal obligation. We did so because there were new signs of communist expansion in the world, because we were

concerned about the survival of democracy in Europe and because it was in our national interest to meet that threat.

I do not believe we will face such a threat in Europe in the foreseeable future. If I am proven wrong and we are called upon to send troops to defend our new allies, the cost of defending a larger NATO would obviously grow. But then, if such a dire threat were to arise, the cost of our entire defense budget would grow, whether we enlarge NATO or not. If I am wrong about our allies' willingness to pay their share of the costs, that, too, is a problem we would face with or without enlargement. For if our interest in the fate of Europe's newly free nations were put at risk, we would not stand idly by, whether we had a formal treaty commitment to defend Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic or not.

The effect of NATO enlargement is to state plainly in advance what we would in any case wish to do if the security of central Europe were threatened. In this way, it is more likely that we will be able to deter such a threat from ever arising. And our friends in the region will gain the confidence and the time they need to build strong, stable, prosperous democracies.

That is why I am more comfortable facing an uncertain future with a larger, stronger NATO than I would be were NATO to stand still. I believe, as President Vaclav Havel so crisply put it when he came to Washington earlier this month, that "even the most costly preventive security is cheaper than the cheapest war."

So as you consider the cost issue, Mr. Chairman, I ask you to consider that there is an even more fundamental issue at stake. It is the value of military alliances to America's security and the importance of our partnership with Europe.

*"The effect of NATO enlargement is to state plainly in advance what we would in any case wish to do if the security of central Europe were threatened. In this way, it is more likely that we will be able to deter such a threat from ever arising. And our friends in the region will gain the confidence and the time they need to build strong, stable, prosperous democracies."*

Here is the strongest, most successful, most dependable alliance America has ever had. Here are three democracies that wish to share the responsibilities of that alliance. Here are three nations that I believe will help us bear the cost of defending freedom, in Europe and beyond, because they know the cost of losing freedom.

In the conduct of foreign policy, we are often preoccupied with crisis. We spend much of our time managing disagreements with nations that do not see the world exactly as we do. In a world where attention to what is wrong often drowns out attention to what is right, we must take care not to forget our friends. We must not take for granted those upon whom we can rely.

Mr. Chairman, the first commandment of foreign policy is much the same as the first commandment of politics: Secure your base. Indeed, across the whole scope of human activity—from the life of the family and the neighborhood to the politics of our nation and the world—when we want to get something done, we start by banding together with those who are closest to us in values and outlook.

That is why we cultivate our partnership with Europe. That is why we seek to extend that partnership to those newly free nations that have always been our allies in spirit, if not in fact. We do so not just to advance our interests across the Atlantic, but because we need dependable democratic allies to advance our interests in every part of the world. ■

*Deputy Secretary Talbott*

# Bridging the Foreign Policy Gap

October 20, 1997

*Address to the Conference on Public Opinion and Foreign Policy held in Washington, DC, sponsored by the Center for International and Security Studies of the University of Maryland.*

Thank you, Mac [Destler], both for that introduction and for the efforts that you, Steve, and Clay have made to probe the complexities of American thinking about the world and the United States' role in it.

For the last several years, the conduct of American foreign policy has had to contend with the adversity of conventional wisdom. The American people, it was often and loudly said, are indifferent to world affairs; they are preoccupied with problems here at home; they are eager to disengage from long-standing global commitments and reject new ones.

In part, this perception is rooted in our history, going back at least to George Washington's farewell address and his warning against foreign entanglements. Without doubt, there is, in the American body politic, a nerve of isolationism. It tends to twitch especially after wars, whether hot or cold. This happened most famously and disastrously after World War I, when that nerve went into a nearly 20-year spasm. In the immediate aftermath of the collapse of the Berlin Wall and the shredding of the Iron Curtain, there were voices saying, in effect, that America had slain the only beast worthy of its global exertions; they advocated protectionist trade practices and isolationist diplomacy, or what might be called anti-diplomacy.

For whom did these voices speak? Did a critical mass of public opinion in this country really want to see the American eagle behave like an ostrich? There was a lot of pessimism on that score. Why? In part, I think, it was because many of us assumed—incorrectly, I believe—that the nation would have trouble making the transition from an era in which the main purpose of American foreign policy could be expressed, literally, on a bumper sticker—"Contain Communism" or "Deter Soviet Aggression"—to one in which it takes at least a paragraph to explain the purpose of American foreign policy.

The more we thought about how that paragraph should read, the more we worried that it would lose readers—and support—out

in the heartland. After all, it would have to include if not the term then at least the concept of globalization, the idea that in an increasingly interdependent world, what happens there matters here, almost no matter where "there" is. Throw in the rising importance of economics and commerce; the need to address cross-border threats such as terrorism and environmental degradation; and the imperative of deepening and broadening the community of nations that share a commitment to democracy, rule of law, and civil society, and before you know it, the paragraph would stretch for a page or more. That was worrisome to the many experts who thought that public support for an American mission abroad was inversely proportional to the number of words it takes to express the mission statement.

Well, that's not necessarily the case. To think that the rationale for American engagement needs to be "dumbed down" for the sake of public comprehension and backing is, I believe, to underestimate and patronize our fellow citizens.

In fact, in this respect as in others, the country may actually be out in front of the government. We in Washington tend to be preoccupied with chapter-headings for history as it unfolds and with neat, fancy-sounding paradigms. For example, here it is 7 years after the dissolution of the U.S.S.R. and the Warsaw Pact and we are still in the habit of talking about this as the "post-Cold War world." But the American people are, to their credit, more impatient for what lies ahead than nostalgic for what lies behind. Many of them may have, in their own minds, adjusted already to what my friend and colleague Sandy Berger has called the end of the end of the Cold War. In other words, they may be ready for a post-bumper-sticker foreign policy.

I hope so. And I suspect so, because in their everyday lives, Americans ought to be able to see, feel, experience, and often profit from the practical realities that define globalization. More and more Americans are invested in the world, both figuratively and literally—through

mutual funds, pension plans, common stocks, and their own companies' dependence on exports. Growth in American businesses large and small is increasingly driven by international trade. More Americans than ever are traveling, working, and studying overseas. Our schools are now comparing the performance of their students—and, I should add, the performance of their teachers—against international norms. Colleges and universities are expanding their course offerings in area studies and foreign languages.

And globalization is a two-way street. Even as the United States exports Disney and MTV to the rest of the world, we are importing and assimilating a great deal from other popular cultures. American moviegoers are buying more tickets to see foreign films, and American record buyers have put music with roots in Mexico, Haiti, and even Iceland at the top of the charts. And Americans from all walks of life are linked through the Internet to the burgeoning population of cyberspace—more than 30 million people in over 100 countries, who are in

touch with each other literally at the speed of light.

Globalization, of course, is a mixed bag: It can be a dangerous two-way street; it entails plenty of bad news, plenty of vulnerabilities and inequities, and plenty of ambiguity.

Americans understand that, too. There is, in the current debate over fast track, a growing fear of losing jobs to other nations and of downward pressure on American wages from foreign competition. There is, in the debate over NATO enlargement and Bosnia, a fear of our being sucked into quarrels in faraway countries between people about whom we know nothing.

Meanwhile, communities across the country are struggling to absorb new immigrants, including a significant number who are here illegally. Both our cities and our suburbs are fighting the flow of drugs from countries such as Colombia and Burma, and we all feel more exposed to the scourges of terrorism and international organized crime than we did even a decade ago.

Yet despite the downside of globalization, withdrawing from the world or erecting barriers against it is not an option. There is no

substitute for or alternative to American leadership in addressing the problems and capitalizing on the opportunities that come with globalization. In short, the purpose of American foreign policy is to make sure that we use our brains, heart, guts, muscle, and wallet to bend the phenomenon of global interdependence to our national and international advantage.

I'd like to think that the report that is being released as part of today's conference is correct in confirming that many Americans recognize and welcome that proposition. However, the report also makes clear that there are still quite a few misconceptions out there in the country about what we're doing in Washington at places like the State Department—especially in what might be called the listening area of talk radio. Whether it's merely misinformation or outright disinformation, it impedes public comprehension of the world and support for American foreign policy.

For example, many people in your survey, like others, believe that we spend as much as 15%-20% of the federal budget on our foreign assistance programs, and they believe something closer to 5%-10% would be more appropriate. In a way, that's heartening, since in fact, roughly 1% of the budget covers all our foreign-affairs spending, from assistance programs to the cost of keeping our consulates and embassies around the world open for business. That's less than one-tenth of what we spend on our armed forces. Yet in a very real sense, it helps buy national security. Bill Perry used to say, when he was at the Pentagon, that he regarded American diplomacy as America's first line of defense. Coming from the Secretary of Defense, that's a pretty powerful endorsement of the foreign affairs account.

Similar myths and misimpressions roil and cloud the current debate over the United Nations. The UN, like virtually any institution that has been around for half a century, is in need of reform. But that doesn't mean the United States no longer needs the UN. Quite the contrary. In this more complicated, post-bumper-sticker world of ours, we need the UN more than ever, not least because it is a bargain—it allows us to leverage U.S. influence and resources. A relatively few American dollars or a relatively few American troops can bring many times more money and if necessary many times more force to bear on a problem.

Precisely this advantage of the UN resonates with a theme that runs throughout the report. Steve, Mac, and Clay have concluded that the American public, while still fundamentally internationalist in outlook, is deeply apprehensive about any suggestion that the

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United States should serve as a “world policeman” or as an all-purpose global trouble-shooter.

Here again, I can only hope that public understanding of the facts will go a long way toward fostering public support for the right policies—and the right international institutions. Having strong multilateral mechanisms for peacekeeping is crucial if we are to minimize the expense and risk that will come with unilateralism. It’s precisely because we don’t aspire to being the Lone Ranger that we’ve devoted so much attention in recent years, from the Gulf War to Haiti to Bosnia, to assembling posses—also known as “coalitions of the willing.”

Leadership sometimes means we must be willing to make tough decisions and act alone. But it also means that in an interdependent world, it will much more often be possible—and certainly desirable—to pursue our interests in concert with others.

Anticipating a point that I suspect Jessica Mathews will make this afternoon, since she has made it powerfully in *Foreign Affairs*, a vigorous and adaptive American foreign policy also means working more with so-called “non-state actors,” such as multinational corporations, private voluntary humanitarian organizations, and think tanks.

We in the U.S. Government often regard these institutions as our natural partners—not always, but often. The same can be said of the UN and international financial institutions such as the World Bank and IMF, and of regional groupings such as the OAS and the ASEAN Regional Forum. We must remain on the lookout for situations in which they have objectives that are compatible with ours and resources that can complement ours.

It was this predisposition for diplomatic joint ventures and coalition-building that allowed us to respond effectively in recent years to crises in the Gulf, the Balkans, the Caribbean, and the Korean Peninsula; it’s been how we’ve worked to build support for the Chemical Weapons Convention and the World Trade Organization. In these and many other cases, American leadership has often made the critical difference between stalemate and progress.

I have no doubt it will also make the difference in ensuring that we are able to advance our national interest in the 21st century—which, by the way, begins in exactly 2 years, 2 months, 11 days, and just over 12 hours. So it’s a good thing we’re wasting no time to get ready for it, including in our understanding of public opinion. ■

**MULTILATERAL****Chemical Weapons**

Convention on the prohibition of the development, production, stockpiling, and use of chemical weapons and on their destruction, with annexes. Done at Paris Jan. 13, 1993.

Entered into force Apr. 29, 1997.

*Ratifications:* Brunei Darussalam, July 28, 1997; Burkina Faso, July 8, 1997; Ghana, July 9, 1997; Guyana, Sept. 12, 1997; Jordan, Oct. 29, 1997; Pakistan, Oct. 28, 1997; Qatar, Sept. 3, 1997; Russian Federation, Nov. 5, 1997.

**Children**

Convention on the protection of children and cooperation in respect of intercountry adoption. Done at The Hague May 29, 1993. Entered into force May 1, 1995.<sup>1</sup>

*Signature:* Denmark, July 2, 1997.

*Ratifications:* Denmark July 2, 1997; Norway, Sept. 25, 1997.<sup>2</sup>

**BILATERAL****Egypt**

Results package grant agreement for small and emerging business support, with annexes. Signed at Cairo Sept. 29, 1997. Entered into force Sept. 29, 1997.

**Haiti**

Memorandum of cooperation concerning the provision of civil aviation assistance. Signed at Port au Prince Aug. 27 and Sept. 3, 1997. Entered into force Sept. 3, 1997.

**Ireland**

Agreement relating to the employment of dependents of official government employees. Effected by exchange of notes at Washington Sept. 17, 1996 and Aug. 1, 1997. Entered into force Aug. 1, 1997.

**Jordan**

Agreement amending the grant agreement for the strategic objective of improving water resources management, with annex. Signed at Amman Aug. 26, 1997. Entered into force Aug. 26, 1997.

Agreement amending the grant agreement of June 26, 1997, for the increased economic opportunities for Jordanians strategic objective, with annex. Signed at Amman Aug. 26, 1997. Entered into force Aug. 26, 1997.

**Macedonia**

Agreement on the consolidation of the debt of the borrower, with attachment. Effected by exchange of letters at Skopje Sept. 17, 1997. Enters into force upon an exchange of notes confirming that all necessary domestic legal requirements have been fulfilled.

**Malawi**

Agreement regarding the provision of commodities, services, and associated military education and training to assist Malawian forces participating in the African Crisis Response Initiative. Effected by exchange of notes at Lilongwe July 28 and Aug. 27, 1997. Entered into force Aug. 27, 1997.

**Nicaragua**

Agreement amending the agreement of May 13, 1992, regarding the consolidation and rescheduling or refinancing of certain debts owed to, guaranteed by, or insured by the U.S. Government and its agencies. Effected by exchange of notes at Managua July 21 and Sept. 26, 1997. Entered into force Sept. 26, 1997.

**Senegal**

Agreement regarding the provision of commodities, services, and associated military education and training to assist Senegalese forces participating in the African Crisis Response Initiative. Effected by exchange of notes at Dakar July 24 and Aug. 29, 1997. Entered into force Aug. 29, 1997.

**Spain**

Implementing arrangement on cooperation in research on radiological evaluations. Signed at Madrid Sept. 15, 1997. Entered into force Sept. 15, 1997.

**Venezuela**

Agreement for scientific and technological cooperation, with annexes. Signed at Caracas Oct. 12, 1997. Entered into force on date on

which parties notify each other that they have complied with the constitutional and statutory requirements necessary for entry into force.

**Zambia**

Agreement regarding the consolidation, reduction, and rescheduling of certain debts owed to, guaranteed by, or insured by the United States Government and its agency,

with annexes. Signed at Lusaka Sept. 26, 1997. Enters into force following signature and receipt by Zambia of written notice from the U.S. that all necessary domestic legal requirements have been fulfilled.

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<sup>1</sup> Not in force for the U.S.

<sup>2</sup> With declaration(s). ■